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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Michael Comstock 
 
Oligarch policy under review?  
At the beginning of Vladimir Putin's presidency, policy toward the many powerful 
Russian oligarchs was based on equidistance. Rather than allowing the various 
interest groups competition for access to the president, Putin advocated large-
scale meetings through organizations such as the Russian Union of Industrialists 
and Entrepreneurs (RUIE). This policy had the advantage of giving Russian 
business interests a more unified platform that they could present to the 
president. However, recent reports seem to indicate that this policy is shifting 
back to more individualized meetings, hinting at a diminution of RUIE's influence. 
(KOMMERSANT-VLAST, 21 May 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Indicators of this trend became apparent when the fifth RUIE-Putin meeting was 
postponed repeatedly, and by the fact that, on the eve of his address to 
parliament, individual oligarchs were invited to the Kremlin for consultation with 
the president. These one-on-one meetings have continued. One of the oligarchs 
recently granted an audience with Putin was machinist tycoon Kakha 
Bendukidze, who addressed tax reform and problems faced by small businesses. 
(KOMMERSANT-VLAST, 31 May 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) It is 
expected that Putin will continue to use the RUIE and other large-scale meetings 
as formal occasions to announce and solidify positions agreed upon in smaller, 
individual meetings.  
 
Factions battle for campaign helm  
Although Vladimir Putin is not up for reelection until 2004, the two principal 
factions within his administration are contending for the right to run his campaign, 
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and thus to shape his campaign promises and policies. These two factions, the 
St. Petersburg Group and former members of Yel'tsin's administration known as 
the "Family," have been waging political war for some time now, with Putin 
favoring the St. Petersburg Group, which he brought into existence (or perhaps 
vice versa). 
 
The most recent skirmish was initiated by Alexander Bespalov's rise to the United 
Russia Party's General Council chairmanship over Vladislav Surkov. Bespalov, 
an active member of the St. Petersburg Group, took control of the pro-Putin party 
over Surkov, who is a deputy director of Alexander Voloshin's presidential 
administration. Voloshin, an old-school member of the "Family," apparently 
realized that he was in danger of losing influence as a result of the St. Petersburg 
Group's piecemeal assumption of resources to be used in the election campaign. 
In response, he quickly founded an election campaign team headed by a 
member of his own camp, Dmitry Medvedev. This team reportedly meets in 
Voloshin's office. The official St. Petersburg Group meets away from the Kremlin, 
supposedly "at locations owned and monitored by the FSB." (OBSHCHAYA 
GAZETA, May 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Both teams are vying for 
the privilege of helping to reelect Putin, and are likely to continue fighting over 
reelection campaign booty from now until Putin's putative second inauguration. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Michael Donahue 
 
To the victors go the spoils  
It is very chic indeed to be a member of the Russian Federal Security Service 
(FSB). Beyond the renewed global implication of anything and everything related 
to the very term "security," the FSB, which began its climb to the top of the 
Russian political pyramid with the election of Vladimir Putin, has achieved a 
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degree of supremacy over its sister security services both within Russia and 
abroad.  
 
While other agencies within the Russian security apparatus have suffered public 
disgrace and failed to rebound quickly, the FSB seems to have developed a 
formula for continued success and ever-increasing responsibilities in the Putin 
era: becoming part of the executive structure itself. Since the 1999 gubernatorial 
election of regional FSB director Vladimir Kulakov to head the Voronezh Region, 
the leadership of the FSB has infiltrated the political arena -- with great success. 
Beside Putin and Kulakov, the FSB alumni organization can count Republic of 
Ingushetia President Gen. Murat Zyazikov, Smolensk Governor-elect Viktor 
Maslov, and perhaps (in a future election in the Tula Region) Vladimir Lebedev 
among those who have successfully made the leap from shadow to overt power. 
(NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 21 May 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Certainly part of the electorate is drawn to these "chekists" because they reflect 
the power and security of the parent organization -- a comforting thought in light 
of the atmosphere of terror that has gripped the world since 11 September. 
However, the spread of FSB power has not been limited to elected positions. 
Last week, for example, Aleksandr Zdanovich, a senior FSB general, was 
appointed deputy director of All-Russian State Television and Radio (VGTRK), 
the body responsible for federal oversight of state-run broadcast media. Some 
analysts believe that placement of a fellow FSB officer in a supervisory position 
over major mass-media outlets may have something to do with next year's 
parliamentary elections. (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 4 Jun 02; via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) After all, shaping public opinion through selective 
reporting does have a long and glorious history in Russia. 
 
Beyond the political arena, the rise of the FSB has been greatly assisted by the 
repeated public disgrace of both the GRU and the SVR. It appears that 
confidence in the security services is a zero-sum game, in which every setback 
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for one service enhances the prestige of the others. If that is so, then the well-
publicized failure of the GRU to obtain American missile technology from the 
Japanese self-defense forces and the unmasking of SVR agents in Western 
countries may have damaged the GRU and SVR, and, in turn, reinforced the 
premier position of the FSB. (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 22 Mar 02; via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) 
 
For its part, the FSB has succeeded in deflecting criticism. The FSB is unlikely to 
undergo senior personnel changes, despite the obvious intelligence failures 
surrounding the Dagestan bombing and calls from the Duma's liberals for FSB 
Director Nikolay Patrushev to resign. On the premise that there must be 
parliamentary oversight over the security services, Sergei Yushenkov proceeds 
to point out that in any Western state "the head of an agency that failed to 
perform his duties resigns." (NTV, 0600 GMT, 21 May 02; BBC Monitoring, via 
ISI Emerging Markets Database) Of course, Yushenkov's assumption concerning 
the West may err on the optimistic side. In light of the well-publicized supposed 
successes of the FSB, including the successful assassination of the terrorist 
Khattab, and the interception of toxic thallium stolen from Russian submarines 
and reportedly destined for Osama bin Laden's operatives, the likelihood that the 
director of the FSB will resign during these "high times" seems slim. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Luba Schwartzman 
 
MEDIA  
If you can't beat them...  
Keeping the media under control is not an easy task. Oligarchs like to sponsor 
newspapers and magazines, radio and television stations. Journalists are a 
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talkative bunch. So sending camouflaged, masked, armed SWAT teams into the 
offices of television stations is a sure way to publicize FSB oppression. Before 
you know it, Western journalists and political scientists are making a fuss, and 
Western politicians are putting pressure on the Russian government. Certainly, 
intimidation works -- but too often a stubborn newspaper like Novaya gazeta, an 
obstinate journalist like Anna Politkovskaya, or a relentless studio director like 
Yevgeny Kiselev will persevere through wrongful lawsuits, death threats, or the 
closing down of television stations.  
 
The Kremlin has several plays in its gamebook which it periodically rotates. One 
perennial strategy is placing a television channel under the direct supervision of 
someone familiar with the media from his duties as a Federal Security Service 
(FSB) spokesman. Especially in this day and age, who could be more faithful to 
the government than one of its "finest"?  
 
Sometimes security officers and select military men have been assigned to head 
media organizations or companies: General Colonel Valery Manilov, former first 
deputy chief of the General Staff, was sent to lead the guild of military journalists 
in the Media Union -- an organization created by the Kremlin in 2001 to compete 
for influence with the Union of Journalists, while Chief of the Interior Ministry 
Directorate for Information and Public Relations Oleg Aksenov became the head 
of TV-7. 
 
At other times, the security service officers have been placed in the position of 
"second in command," like the political commissars of yore, or the ethnic 
Russians in the apparats of the Soviet republics. In 1999, General Yuri 
Kobaladze, previously the head of the press office in the Russian Foreign 
Intelligence Service, was appointed first deputy director of ITAR-TASS. The head 
of the FSB's anti-terrorism department, Vladimir Kozlov, became deputy media 
minister. (NOVYE IZVESTIA, 5 Jun 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database)  
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A former Foreign Intelligence Service officer, Lev Koshlyakov, whose only 
experience with journalism was using it as a cover for his espionage activities, 
headed the Vesti news program on RTR Television, while fellow spy Igor 
Adamov became the head of Radio Russia. (KOMMERSANT, 4 Jun 02; via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database)  
 
...Join them  
This game plan was temporarily put aside as cruder intimidation tactics came to 
be employed. But then, on 4 June, Major General Aleksandr Zdanovich, the chief 
of the FSB Assistance Programs Directorate, was appointed deputy chairman of 
the VGTRK (All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, 
which oversees state-owned broadcast media). Zdanovich, a graduate of the 
KGB Higher School and an employee of the security service since 1972, has 
been on the forefront of the FSB's public relations campaigns. Being a Federal 
Security Service spokesman can be a dirty job, and, in his performance, 
Zdanovich superbly proved his loyalty and his ability to voice "terminological 
inexactitudes" with a straight face. He glibly fed disinformation to journalists and 
to the Russian public, circulating stories about a purported Chechen link to the 
1999 Moscow bombings and to the plane crash that killed journalist Artem 
Borovik, as well as spreading rumors about Raduev's death. (NOVYE IZVESTIA, 
5 Jun 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) At times, 
he gave "eye-witness accounts" that were later proved false. For example, in 
February 2001, Zdanovich told journalists that Kenneth Gluck -- an employee of 
the Doctors Without Borders humanitarian operation, who supposedly had been 
kidnapped by Chechen terrorists -- was released as a result of a special raid 
carried out by FSB, while later, Gluck reported that he had seen no trace of a 
special operation. In another notable incident, the major general described a 
"cleansing operation" in Starye Atagi in glowing terms, and claimed that the 
elders of the village thanked him for "destroying the bandits that had been 
terrorizing the village." At another point, Zdanovich was convicted of slander 
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against Media-MOST television company, although that decision was later 
reversed. (KOMMERSANT, 4 Jun 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
Understandably, Zdanovich is not very well liked by the media. 
 
Zdanovich's job description centers around the word "security," which he explains 
as having "a very broad meaning [including] economic security as well as 
financial security threats to journalists and the company's correspondents." 
Zdanovich made no attempts to deny that he will keep in touch with his former 
office: "As you know, there are no former security officers," he joked, adding that 
he would prefer not to go into details. (IZVESTIA, 5 Jun 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-
0605, via World News Connection) 
 
It sounds like the typical job for an FSB man: providing "krysha" -- protection, 
except of a rather formal nature -- to a business. What will he want in return? Not 
money, so much as a certain level of obedience by journalists and oversight of 
information. Now, instead of being seen publicly as pursuing undesirable media 
outlets, the FSB will simply protect the ones it favors. 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
Game...  
Playing with the media is a moderately difficult game. The joust against the leftist 
opposition, however, has been a piece of cake for the Kremlin. The ultra-left 
Communists, headed by Party Chairman Gennady Zyuganov, attempted to throw 
their weight around by expelling three State Duma deputies -- State Duma 
Speaker Gennady Seleznev, the head of the Culture and Tourism Committee 
Nikolai Gubenko, and the head of the Women's, Family, and Youth Affairs 
Committee Svetlana Goryacheva -- for lack of party discipline. In protest, Nizhny 
Novgorod Oblast' Governor Gennady Khodyrev and Volgograd Oblast Council 
Chairman Sergei Mikhailov -- powerful Communist "moderates" -- handed in their 
party tickets. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 1 Jun 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0603, via 
World News Connection, and ORT, 7 Jun 02; via www.ortv.ru)  
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Zyuganov's supporters insist that the controversy will not cause a major split in 
the party: Deputy Chairman of the Communist Party Ivan Melnikov dismissed the 
Khodyrev example as the emergence of weak links. (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 
5 Jun 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) And yet 
already there is an obvious difference between the actions of the "moderates" 
and the "extremists." Zyuganov himself has been on a spree of criticism against 
the Kremlin -- he was particularly upset about the signing of the new Russian-
American Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, calling it an "unconditional 
capitulation," and accusing Russia of "helping an aggressor country, which is 
now imposing its policy on the entire world." Zyuganov also accused President 
George W. Bush of having had prior information about the 11 September attacks. 
(INTERFAX, 1427 GMT, 23 May 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0523, via World News 
Connection) 
 
...Set...  
Zyuganov also mounted a personal attack against President Putin, declaring that 
he had "only brought stability that would lead to extinction, stability for 
corruption," and proclaiming that more than 100 Duma deputies would back his 
call for a no-confidence vote in Putin's government. (REUTERS, 30 May 02; via 
Johnson's Russia List) The CPRF chairman also stated that "Mr. Putin and our 
Foreign Ministry are violating the strategic accords with the People's Republic of 
China. They are worsening the climate between our countries, they are 
worsening the situation on the planet as a whole." (RIA, 30 May 02; Kremlin 
Package, via ISI Emerging Markets Database)  
 
...Match  
Meanwhile, Seleznev is enjoying the approval and verbal support of everyone 
from President Putin and the former president of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, 
to representatives of centrist United Russia. (EKHO MOSKVY, 27 May 02; CRAS 
Radio & TV Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
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In return, Seleznev has been echoing concepts proposed by the party of the 
Kremlin. He suggested that Russia follow France's example in "limiting the 
showing of foreign movies" on TV -- a move that fits like a glove with United 
Russia's bill "On Russian as the State Language of the Russian Federation," 
which has been accepted in its first reading. The bill would prohibit the use -- in 
official communications -- of words insulting the race, nationality, profession, 
social status, age, sex, language, and religious, political, or other conviction of 
Russian citizens; of unprintable words; and of foreign words or word 
combinations that have analogues in the Russian language. (INTERFAX, 1101 
GMT, 17 May 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0517, via World News Connection, and ORT, 
7 Jun 02; via www.ortv.ru) 
 
Moreover, as if to make sure that no one thinks all this is a coincidence, 
Seleznev waxed poetic in homage of the presidential bill on extremism, also 
recently accepted in the first reading: "The citizens of Russia must treasure the 
heritage they have -- the broadest spectrum of languages and cultures and the 
diversity of local lore." (ITAR-TASS, 1750 GMT, 17 May 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-
0517, via World News Connection, and ORT, 6 Jun 02; via www.ortv.ru) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Ansel Stein 
 
Putin's Asian interests 
President Putin has been devoting much of his energy to cultivate a renewed 
Asian role for Russia and to reaffirm Russia's "patron" status among existing 
associates. The focus is not incidental, given constraints that have emerged in 
other areas where Moscow has maintained interest in the past -- constraints 
created by active US interest (i.e., American troop presence in Georgia and 
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Central Asia) and by Moscow's own past behavior (raising suspicions about its 
sincerity in mediation between India and Pakistan).  
 
ARMENIA  
On 30 May the secretary of the Russian Security Council, Vladimir Rushailo, 
concluded an official visit to Armenia, during which he managed to meet with all 
ranking leaders of the republic. He passed a letter from Russian President 
Vladimir Putin to Armenian President Robert Kocharian, and conducted 
consultations with Defense Minister Serzhik Sarkisian and the head of the special 
services Karlos Petrosian. Official Yerevan once again confirmed the 
"significance of the strategic partnership with Moscow," while Rushailo noted that 
"coordination of our actions on actual issues of the foreign policy is yielding more 
and more results." (VREMYA NOVOSTI, 30 May 02; via lexis-nexis) 
 
The result of this coordination was the renewal of the Russian-Armenian patron-
client relationship, mainly in terms of arms sales. Armenia has requested 
Russian assistance in overhauling, repairing and extending the service life of 
existing weapons, in addition to the delivery of military products from Russia. 
Yerevan also is looking to Moscow for assistance with the overall modernization 
of Armenia's armed forces. (ARMINFO, 1359 GMT, 29 May 02; BBC Monitoring, 
via lexis-nexis) Despite lingering doubts elsewhere concerning the Russian 
army's ability to assist in the modernization of anything, Moscow's willingness to 
be forthcoming on this issue is significant. Armenia already owes Russia 
approximately $100 million. There is no reason to expect that Armenia will be 
able to pay for the new arms or training agreed upon during this last visit. Russia 
is apparently more than willing to donate these goods and ignore Armenia's 
existing debts in exchange for an expected political payoff. 
 
Moscow also sponsored a meeting between the Prime Minister of Abkhazia, Anri 
Jergenia, and the President of South Ossetia, Eduard Kokoiti Kokoev, on 31 
May, with unsurprising results. The two men agreed that the situation in their 
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breakaway regions may deteriorate sharply as a result of American aid to the 
Georgian armed services. "The circumstances in neighboring Georgia convince 
the South Ossetian population and leaders that only still closer ties with Russia 
may safeguard peace and stability in the region," said Kokoev. The two leaders 
agreed to come to each other's aid in the event of any attack by Georgia. 
(INTERFAX, 0725 GMT, 31 May 02; BBC Monitoring, via lexis-nexis) If a conflict 
does break out, Russian arms, and most likely Russian troops, will support the 
separatist regions. 
 
INDIA  
At the first summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building 
Measures in Asia (CICBMA) in Almaty, Kazakhstan on 4 June, Putin met with 
Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Pakistani President General 
Pervez Musharraf in an attempt to defuse tensions between the two countries. 
However, the hard-line positions of both states, and Russia's own bilateral 
relations with them, ensured little progress. On the eve of his meeting with the 
Russian president, Musharraf explained, "We have a deep respect for Putin. He 
is a very dynamic and intelligent leader. But Russia has very close relations with 
India, and this is an important factor." (IZVESTIA, 5 Jun 02; via lexis-nexis) 
 
CHINA  
The very next day Putin noted that relations with China constituted "a 
considerable priority" in Russia's foreign policy, based on an existing Sino-
Russian agreement "envisioning [a] strategic partnership." (ITAR-TASS, 5 Jun 
02; via lexis-nexis) Subsequent statements indicate that a strategic partnership 
indeed is in effect. Chinese President Jiang Zemin arrived in Saint Petersburg 
last week for a meeting of the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO) linking 
Moscow and Beijing with four Central Asian states -- Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. During the conference Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov 
said that Russia and China are actively coordinating their foreign policy activities. 
Ivanov said that the two countries have a "full understanding" on this issue, that 
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their mechanisms of coordination "are well tuned," and that within this 
coordination Russian and Chinese diplomats discuss and agree on all 
fundamental international policy issues. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces and Military-
Industrial Complex 
By Scott Bethel 
 
Making the new relationship with NATO work 
The new relationship between NATO and Russia not only will be played out on 
the political stage in Brussels, but also may have a major ripple effect among the 
militaries of both sides. For the Russians, the issues are threefold: First, what the 
"Russia-NATO Council" will mean for the current state of the military; second, 
what effect a closer relationship with NATO will have on current Russian military 
sales agreements; and third, what effect a more specific military relationship with 
NATO will have on future negotiations with the United States.  
 
The formal relationship between Russia and NATO is based on the Russia-
NATO Council. This body is the result of feverish work by Vladimir Putin as well 
as NATO Secretary-General George Robertson, British Prime Minister Tony Blair 
and Italian President Silvio Burlusconi. (WASHINGTON POST, 29 May 02; via 
washingtonpost.com) The key element is the so-called "Group of 20," or, more 
specifically, the 19 NATO countries plus Russia. The Group of 20, according to 
US Secretary of State Colin Powell, is still a "work in progress and as such the 
precise nature of the council has yet to be defined. " (IBID.) But those close to 
the "historic" signing of the "Rome Accords" agree that the council's basic 
premise will be twofold: First is a focus on the threat posed by international 
terrorism. The Russians claim that they are fighting their own war against 
terrorism in Chechnya and that they are simply being "joined" by the Americans 
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and Europeans in this effort. (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 29 May 02; via 
www.nytimes.com). Second, the council will tackle problems such as 
disarmament and international security. (ORT, 0800 GMT, 6 Jun 02; via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) 
 
The accords do not envisage Russian veto power over any NATO initiatives, a 
major concern of the United States as well as some of the other NATO member 
states. (US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 6 Jun 02; via www.USNEWS.com) 
However, the Russians will have access to the discussions and to these specific 
NATO activities. Further, Russia's relationship with NATO as well as with 
member states will become increasingly formal in the areas of information 
exchange and cooperation. 
 
In an effort to downplay the significance of this move for the military, Defense 
Minister Sergei Ivanov highlighted the importance of Russian participation in 
existing international fora including the UN, OSCE and the Asian Pacific 
Economic Council (APEC). (ITAR-TASS, 1037 GMT, 6 Jun 02; via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) He emphasized that Russia will not make or adjust any of its 
planning based on NATO input or desires. (ITAR-TASS, 1005 GMT, 6 Jun 02; via 
ISI Emerging Markets Database) However, if the Russians decide to escalate 
cooperative exchanges from a mere political forum to joint exercise activities or 
military-to-military exchanges, they run the risk of revealing to NATO the sorry 
condition of their force capabilities. The pathetic state of the Russian military is 
unlikely to come as a surprise to anyone in NATO; however, a closer look would 
verify the long-standing negative assessments by most outside observers. 
 
Both Sergei Ivanov and his counterpart in the foreign ministry, Igor Ivanov, have 
stated clearly that the new relationship with NATO would have no effect on 
agreements that are already signed or in current negotiations. (ITAR-TASS, 1254 
GMT, 4 Jun 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) In fact, the Russians are 
working with Turkey for the first time ever to sell to the Turkish Air Force more 
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than 130 helicopter gunships. However, what is most important is for the 
Russians to be able to continue the cash-and-carry deals they have underway 
with Iran and India and to continue to pursue further markets in South America 
and Asia. 
 
The Russians do not expect the new formation of the NATO-Russian Council to 
affect bilateral relations with other countries. In fact, President Putin himself 
confirmed that the council would not interrupt dialogue between Moscow and 
Washington. (ITAR-TASS, 1037 GMT, 5 Jun 02; via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) Also, the Russians are making an effort to reassure other powerful 
states that the council will not have a negative impact on existing relationships. 
Specifically, in several interviews Sergei Ivanov declared that the NATO 
partnership would only "enhance" relations with China and India and would not 
pose any threat to those two powerful neighbors. (ORT, 1300 GMT, 31 May 02; 
via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Despite such assurances, however, the new relationship may have some impact 
on Russia's dealings with other states. Moscow's sales to known supporters of 
global terrorism (such as Iran and Iraq) and to known human rights violators 
(such as Myanmar, Iraq and Iran) are difficult to ignore.  
 
Show me the money 
The defense ministry is pursuing pay and pension increases in an effort to gain 
and maintain support from both active duty and retired Russian military members 
for other, less-popular reforms (the Russian military council has determined the 
need to cut more than 600,000 military and civilian posts over the next three 
years).  
 
Vladimir Putin has ordered that pay for active duty military members will be 
higher than remuneration to their counterparts in the Russian bureaucracy. 
Discussions concerning pay raises have been ongoing in the Ministry of Defense 
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for some time. The Russian leadership has made it clear that the new pay 
increases will be implemented on 1 July 2002 for the enlisted ranks and on 1 
January 2003 for the officers. (RUSSIA TV, 1300 GMT, 20 May 02; via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) However, the president and Defense Minister 
Ivanov have been nonspecific when determining the exact amount of the raises, 
saying only that they will be "significant." (ITAR-TASS, 1020 GMT, 7 May 02; via 
ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
This topic matters for two reasons: First, Putin and Ivanov are well aware that 
corruption is rampant in the armed forces. It is an endemic problem in the system 
and part of the motivation for raising the payscale is the hope that it will end 
some of the corruption. However, the Russians still use an antiquated system of 
cash payments and paymasters to compensate the troops. As a result, much of 
the actual monies promised to the forces are skimmed off before they actually 
reach the field. So far, no proposal has been heard to streamline this process 
and to move toward a system of automatic deposit or to a process designed to 
limit the number of persons with direct access to the money.  
 
The second major objective for the pay raise is to increase the prestige of the 
military. (ITAR-TASS, 1020 GMT, 7 May 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
With an increased amount of pay, military officers can live at a higher standard 
and in many cases better than their civilian counterparts. Putin has noted the 
increased risk (in Chechnya) and the need to relocate frequently that the military 
faces. The pay raise is meant to satisfy the troops by attempting to provide 
increased financial security. 
 
The same cannot be said, however, for the military's workforce. Putin and Ivanov 
have declared that some 470,000 military and 130,000 civilian jobs will be 
eliminated over the next three years. According to two major publications, the 
Ministry of Defense has deemed many Russian civilian jobs to be redundant in 
an overall effort to cut costs. (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 31 May 02; via ISI 
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Emerging Markets Database) Specifically targeted were senior officer postings, 
including general officers. There are nearly 6,000 generals and admirals 
assessed by the military to be serving in posts more suited to colonels or navy 
captains or even lower ranks. 
 
Cost cutting is essential for the Russian military to be able to afford the increased 
pay for the troops. There have been long-standing complaints by the Duma, as 
well as from quarters within the military itself, over the top-heaviness and lack of 
production of the senior staff. The decrease in numbers will accomplish two 
major goals: 
 
First, thinning out the bloated bureaucracy will make space available at the top 
for new officers and senior civilians with the potential for fresher ideas. Such 
culling of the herd often has the effect of raising morale and increasing the goals 
of the younger and newer officers. It serves also as an effective warning to those 
who are "retired on active duty," i.e., those who do not provide any added value 
to their service through their work. 
 
Second, the reduction will pave the way for a more professional military. It would 
seem logical that this effort would help efforts to move away from the conscript-
based Soviet-style armed force to a more contract-based volunteer military. Such 
a shift would have long-lasting results for the Russian armed forces and would 
effectively position them for increased participation (and perhaps eventual parity) 
with their European counterparts. 
 
These efforts are concurrent with Putin's recently approved pension reform effort. 
Though the reforms are not specifically targeted at the military, they do take into 
account low and inconsistent payments to pensioners across the board. Putin 
has the Duma's approval for an additional 2.7 billion rubles to ensure timely and 
complete payments to all pensioners and even a reserve fund to keep the flow of 
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income uninterrupted during times of economic shortfalls. (ORT, 1000 GMT, 2 
Jun 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
The pay raise and the force reduction efforts may produce a more satisfied and 
efficient officer corps. With higher pay and more opportunities for promotion, the 
quality of the individuals choosing a military career will improve. In addition, the 
savings associated with cutting dead weight also will free resources and 
positions for those currently in the recruitment and training pipeline. While the 
pay increases will produce satisfaction, there will be sizeable institutional 
reluctance to streamline. A bureaucracy of the size and magnitude of the 
Russian military takes on a life of its own. As a result, any effort to reduce its size 
or power will be met with the stiffest resistance. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
BELARUS  
The politics of a bully . . .  
One thing has always been abundantly clear about Belarusian President 
Alyaksandr Lukashenka: He wants things his way and only his way. Those who 
don't agree with him can either go away or be assisted in going away. Period. 
 
This policy has served the president well over the years, as one by one his 
opponents have mysteriously disappeared, been forced into exile or been locked 
away in a prison cell. In the center of Europe, Lukashenka gradually has created 
his own fiefdom, forging his image out of the ruins of Stalinism, clinging to old 
Soviet traditions that keep the population in fear and selective ignorance.  
 
Placed in the middle of this Soviet bastion was the OSCE Advisory and 
Monitoring Group in Belarus (AMG), charged in 1997 with the task of "assisting 
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the Belarusian authorities in promoting democratic institutions and in complying 
with other OSCE commitments; and monitoring and reporting on this process." 
(OSCE ANNUAL REPORT 1998; via www.osce.org) Unfortunately, there weren't 
many democratic institutions to help promote. The AMG's reports, therefore, 
usually noted significant violations of OSCE standards and principles and 
consistently irritated Lukashenka. This wasn't what he wanted, after all. And so 
the AMG, at least for now, has been made to go away.  
 
On 3 June, Andrew Carpenter, the acting head of the AMG, was forced to leave 
Belarus after his visa was not renewed. This followed the refusal of Belarusian 
authorities to renew the visa of Carpenter's predecessor, Michel Rivolier. As a 
result, although the AMG technically still exists, it currently is "unable to carry out 
its objectives," according to Portuguese Foreign Minister Martins da Cruz, the 
current OSCE chairman. (INTERFAX, 1524 GMT, 4 Jun 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-
0604, via World News Connection) In other words, the AMG is unable to monitor 
and report on the human rights situation in the country. Lukashenka should be 
thrilled: The OSCE has been the loudest, strongest -- and often only -- Western 
critic of conditions inside Belarus. Much of that criticism was based on AMG 
information. At least for now, the dwindling and beleaguered democratic 
opposition in Belarus has lost an important ally. 
 
In his statement following Carpenter's exit from the country, Cruz, an obvious 
master of understatement, suggested, "Such an attitude from Belarusian 
authorities fails to promote the desirable normalization of relations between 
Belarus and the OSCE." (IBID.) But, while this is obviously true, the question now 
is, "So what?"  
 
The unfortunate fact is that the OSCE has been documenting and publicizing 
grave violations of human rights in Belarus for years. With the exception of the 
United States, most OSCE member countries have chosen to speak rarely and 
carry a very small stick regarding Lukashenka. This has meant that, while the 
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work of the AMG has been admirable, in the West it has had little impact. Take, 
for example, the case of the Belarusian "death squads."  
 
In July of 2001, two Belarusian officers released what the US State Department 
called "credible" evidence that Lukashenka had ordered the creation of a police 
unit to "make disappear" at least 30 his political opponents. (For background, see 
THE NIS OBSERVED, 1 Aug 01) Shortly thereafter and in advance of a G-8 
summit, the chairman of the US Commission on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe sent a letter to President George W. Bush about the matter. "We call 
upon you," US Representative Christopher Smith (R-NJ) wrote, "to encourage 
our G-8 partners, including President Putin, to press the Belarusian authorities to 
conduct a complete and transparent investigation of the disappearances." He 
also called for the "release of political prisoners" and asked that Lukashenka be 
pressured to ensure the 9 September 2001 elections were "free, fair and 
transparent." (SMITH LETTER, 8 Jul 01; via www.csce.gov) Unfortunately, his 
letter received no public response. Western leaders took no note of the situation 
in Belarus. And, despite the fact that Russian President Vladimir Putin is closely 
linked to Lukashenka through the Russia-Belarus Union, it seems that the 
Russian president was not questioned about the situation. 
 
Not surprisingly, the September 2001 were not free, fair or transparent, according 
to the Election Observation Statement of the OSCE and Council of Europe. The 
monitors criticized "a campaign of intimidation directed against opposition 
activists, domestic observation organizations, opposition and independent media, 
and a smear campaign against international observers." (ELECTION 
OBSERVATION MISSION STATEMENT OF PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND 
CONCLUSIONS, 10 Sep 01) Not surprisingly, this announcement also garnered 
little attention, except of course from Lukashenka, who railed against "Western 
provocations." But the Belarusian president should perhaps have been pleased. 
The statement on the presidential election was a significant improvement from 
the one regarding the parliamentary elections held the year before. Then, the 
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OSCE found the country did not even meet the minimal standards necessary for 
it to send election observers.  
 
Today, Belarusian authorities have once again arrested and put on trial 
Lukashenka's last remaining nationally known political opponent, former Prime 
Minister Mikhail Chyhir. With this current trial, Chyhir sets his own special record 
-- he has been arrested and tried once every year for the last three years. This 
year, though, he has a partner; authorities also have jailed his 26-year-old son, 
Aleksandr.  
 
Unfortunately, the AMG is unable focus on such events now, given the two-
person skeleton staff remaining in the country. What is important to note, 
however, is that even though Western leaders may not miss the AMG's 
information -- since they often ignored it anyway -- democratic activists inside 
and outside Belarus will. It is they who have long depended on the AMG's 
support. OSCE/AMG assistance was essential, for example, to opposition 
political parties attempting to withstand Lukashenka's pressure tactics during the 
2000 parliamentary elections. Indeed, within Belarus, the loss of the AMG will be 
a sharp blow for those attempting to oppose Lukashenka's ever-increasing 
dictatorial methods. In a country largely cut off from the West, the small AMG 
office is important, not only for its physical, but also its psychological significance. 
One hopes -- although it seems unlikely -- that the international community will 
recognize this and do what is necessary to return the AMG to full strength. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
GEORGIA  
Anti-GUUAM still at it  
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Occasionally there are hints of substantial coordination among the leaders of the 
rebellious entities that threaten Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova. On 20-22 
November 2001, the "foreign ministers" of the rebel entities -- Nagorno-
Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdniestr -- met in Tiraspol to 
coordinate their policies and issue joint statements. According to OSCE sources, 
such meetings have been held on several other occasions in the past, including 
one meeting roughly a year earlier, with representatives of the same separatist 
entities participating. The meeting was held in Moscow and may have included 
consultations with representatives from the Russian military and the Duma. 
 
Now, however, we have it from the horse's mouth. On a visit to Moscow, Abkhaz 
Vice President Valery Arshba told military paper Krasnaya zvezda that "we can 
talk about a certain coordination of steps with South Ossetia, Transdnestria, and 
Nagorno-Karabakh ... With the election of the new South Ossetian president, we 
definitely know that South Ossetia and Abkhazia have the same aims in relation 
to Georgia." (INTERFAX, 0754 GMT, 29 May 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0529, via 
World News Connection) 
 
How do Chechens travel from Pankisi?  
So much attention has been focused on the Chechen-Georgian border that it has 
become rather difficult to cross -- apart from the dangers inherent in the tricky 
mountain passes, the Russian airborne are guarding the border, the OSCE 
monitoring mission is surveying the area, and journalists are traipsing about the 
area. It is far easier to cross the border in another location and then make one's 
way to Chechnya. The obvious choice is South Ossetia, which has a customs-
free regime with Russia. In a recent interview with Novaya gazeta, a Chechen 
refugee in Pankisi revealed that this is precisely the preferred route to return to 
Grozny. "People take the minibus to Vladikavkaz. A seat costs 100 lari ($50). A 
family would require a whole minibus which is $600. For the people here this is a 
huge sum. Plus traveling from Vladikavkaz to Grozny can be difficult and 
dangerous." (NOVAYA GAZETA, 6 Jun 02) 
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Local elections: a road map for the succession?  
The major figures in Georgian politics used the 2 June local elections to launch 
their campaign for Georgia's post-Shevardnadze transition. Parliamentary 
elections next year will set the stage for presidential elections in 2005. Analysts 
in Georgia and abroad are looking to the results of the local elections to 
formulate and analyze strategies for the parliamentary and presidential races. On 
the positive side, the local elections prove that there is genuine political pluralism 
in Georgia. On the negative side, the elections also show that there are deep and 
persistent rifts in society which can threaten democratic transition. (Jaba 
Devdariani, "Reformists Vie to Establish Power Base in Georgian Local 
Elections," EURASIANET, 29 May 02, and Giorgi Sepashvili and Nino Kutsidze, 
"Political Parties Position Themselves for the General Elections," CIVIL.GE, 31 
May 02) 
 
Russia's transition illustrates the potential pitfalls. Russia's first president set a 
precedent of sorts by "managing" the succession to a new president. Pressed by 
an impeachment drive in a hostile parliament, international corruption probes into 
his family and administration, and the defections to the opposition of two 
successive prime ministers (Yevgeni Primakov and Sergei Stepashin), Boris 
Yel'tsin decided to protect himself. Hence, he ceded power to an agent of the 
security services, who had guaranteed the Yel'tsin clan immunity from 
prosecution. Then, an internal war galvanized popular opinion around Yel'tsin's 
chosen successor, Vladimir Putin. As a result of the "managed" transition, the 
security services enjoy a degree of power in Russia that is unparalleled even in 
Soviet history.  
 
The danger is that in the coming years the aging Presidents Eduard 
Shevardnadze of Georgia and Haydar Aliev of Azerbaijan, with society 
increasingly alienated, may find themselves in Yel'tsin's situation. Moreover, 
because they preside over small, weak states bordering on Russia, an election 
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that is seen as "managed" through insider deals will leave the successors even 
more vulnerable than the current presidents. Over the last two years Ukraine's 
President Leonid Kuchma has demonstrated that even a legitimate leader 
becomes very vulnerable to Russian pressure if he is seen as coercive at home. 
This is doubly true of Georgia: If a candidate comes to power through coercion 
and deception, he will be Putin's plaything.  
 
In this context, the significance of the local elections is that they point to a way 
out for Georgia. The best scenario is one by which over the next two years the 
president and the reformist opposition back away from confrontation. Although 
the elections were hastily planned, chaotic and in some cases fraudulent, the 
manifest presence of several reformist, independent, and thoroughly patriotic 
parties means that there is room to maneuver in the runup to the parliamentary 
elections. The fluidity of current alignments suggests that a popular, independent, 
and reformist government can be achieved. To ensure this outcome, the most 
outspoken government critics must moderate their comments. [In fact some 
Georgian intellectuals have issued calls on all parties to lower the rhetorical 
flourishes -- which are becoming personal and in some cases ethnic (for 
example, the statements of Areshidze, Giorgi Sepashvili and Nino Kutsidze).] For 
their part the authorities must foreswear coercion and intimidation. 
 
The fact that even in wealthy Tbilisi neighborhoods many voters were omitted 
from the lists testifies to the chaotic organization. (Irakly Areshidze, "Early 
Review of Georgia's Elections," 5 Jun 02; via irakly@psigeorgia.org) In one town, 
Rustavi, all the ballots were stolen by armed men before they could be delivered 
to polling stations. In another location, the ballots did not arrive on time and the 
election was postponed. The abysmal lack of organization rather than vote-
rigging was the main source of complaint. Most parties and analysts attributed 
this problem to the fact that the elections were announced in April, which gave 
the Central Electoral Commission only one month to plan and organize. 
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The alliances among parties and their relative standing may change considerably 
over the next two years. Moreover, the results for most regional polls have not 
been announced. However, it is warranted to use the results of the elections to 
the Tbilisi legislature to identify the major factions in Georgian politics, because 
the parties campaigned aggressively in Tbilisi and the leaders treated the event 
as the start of the succession battle. The speakership of the Tbilisi legislature will 
be a podium for a presidential bid. 
 
Labor Party: (26%) The surprise front-runner party is led by Shalva Natelashvili. 
At the party's third congress last month, the program called for nationalization of 
certain key industries as an alternative to oligarchic capitalism. The party also 
calls for direct elections for regional executives (gamgebeli, who are presently 
appointed by the president) and moving up parliamentary and presidential 
elections to 2002. (SARKE, 1 May 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
Natelashvili has been highly critical of Shevardnadze, and has better "outsider" 
credentials than any of the other reformers who have all held top government 
positions recently. Some say that the Labor Party -- which is personality driven 
and lacks a regional structure -- will fizzle out before the parliamentary elections. 
(Jaba Devdariani, "Chaotic Local Elections Yield Dubious Results in Georgia," 
EURASIANET, 4 Jun 02; ISI Emerging Markets Database) It's not clear with 
which parties Labor will align in the Tbilisi legislature, but it is certain that 
Natelashvili is the big winner who will be courted by the other factions.  
 
National Movement: (24%) The party of former Justice Minister Mikhail 
Saakashvili is aligned closely with Zurab Zhvania and the two leaders have made 
joint declarations calling for Shevardnadze's resignation. Saakashvili resigned 
from the government last summer, accusing the present leadership of failing to 
adopt sufficient measures to fight corruption. Since then, Saakashvili has 
emerged as one of the loudest challengers to the present government. On 29 
May, he flew to Strasbourg, the seat of the European Court, to denounce the 
election as fraud -- three days before the elections. Hence, few were surprised 
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when he demanded a recount of the Tbilisi race and alleged that the balloting 
had been rigged. 
 
New Rights: (12%) Unlike the other parties, New Rights is not positioning itself 
against Shevardnadze but against his loudest critics, Zhvania and Saakashvili. 
Levan Gachelizade, one of the founders of the party, is the arch rival to 
Saakashvili. The most bitter personal attacks were exchanged between the 
leaders of New Rights, National Movement, and Zhvania's team. The New Rights 
party is by no means a presidential party, but it has maneuvered successfully to 
pick up deputies from the nearly defunct Citizen's Union of Georgia to establish 
itself firmly in the Georgian parliament. The leader of the parliamentary fraction is 
David Gamkrelidze, while Levan Gachelizade is expected to make a bid for the 
speakership of the Tbilisi City Council. (Irakly Areshidze and Paata 
Chakhnashivili, "Georgian Local Elections Will Reshape Country's Political 
Landscape," EURASIANET, 6 Jun 02) 
 
Christian Conservative Party - Zhvania's Team: (8%) Former Parliament Speaker 
Zurab Zhvania headed the presidential party, the Citizens Union of Georgia 
(CUG), but has moved into the opposition, particularly since the student 
demonstrations in Tbilisi last fall. Due to his rift with the president, Zhvania's CUG 
was denied registration at the last possible moment. The Christian Conservative 
party which had registration but did not expect to perform well invited Zhvania's 
party to run on its slate. The maneuvering cost Shevardnadze prestige and in the 
end failed to disqualify his rival. Zhvania is expected to form a close alliance with 
Saakashvili's National Movement. However, it's not at all clear that either of these 
sparkling personalities would endorse the other for the Tbilisi speakership (or for 
president).  
 
Industrialists: (7%) Founded by Gogi Topadze, this upper-class party is expected 
to work closely with the New Rights party. It is extremely wary of the calls for 
nationalization of certain industries that are coming from the Labor Party.  
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Revival Party: (6%) This primarily regional party is led by Ajaria's President Aslan 
Abashidze, who has relied on the Russian military presence in his republic to 
assert himself against Shevardnadze. Abashidze was the main contender 
against Shevardnadze in the last presidential elections. The poor showing 
dampens Abashidze's presidential ambitions. Local elections will be held in Ajaria 
on 16 June, hence the party's performance in its stronghold cannot be 
determined at present. 
 
Unity: (4%) The pro-Russian and aptly named "Unity" party barely cleared the 
4% hurdle for city council representation. Its leader, Djumber Patiashvili, is the 
Soviet-era party boss who presided over the 9 April 1989 massacre of unarmed 
student demonstrators in Tbilisi, which inspired the democratic movement to call 
for Georgian independence. Patiashvili signed a cooperation agreement with 
Putin's Unity party in Moscow on 5 June. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 7 Jun 02) 
 
Citizens' Union of Georgia (CUG): (3%) Led by Levan Mamaladze, the rump 
presidential party succeeded in forcing Zhvania to run with a different party 
affiliation. The party name did not help very much, however, since its candidates 
did not manage to clear the 4% hurdle for the Tbilisi City Council. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By David Montgomery 
 
KYRGYZSTAN 
Clan influence on political instability 
The 22 May resignation of Kyrgyz Prime Minister Kurmanbek Bakiev and the 
subsequent legally mandated dissolution of the entire cabinet have left President 
Askar Akaev searching for both local and international support of his rule. 
Bakiev's resignation came in response to the May protests and unrest which 
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reflected the north-south division within the country. As suggested in THE NIS 
OBSERVED (22 May 02), the initial causes of the most recent protests were: 1) 
the upcoming report on the 17-18 March riots in Aksy in which five persons were 
killed and around 90 were injured; 2) the criminal proceedings against the 
parliament deputy Azimbek Beknazarov from the southern Jalal-Abad region; 3) 
the sentencing of opposition leader Felix Kulov; and 4) the cession of land to 
China. Examining the issues more closely, however, reveals the magnitude of 
the threat to the Akaev leadership and gives insight to the political stability of the 
country. 
 
All of the above-noted developments enabled the political opposition to capitalize 
on its efforts to weaken Akaev's control of power and resources. The opposition 
seized on the 17 May 2002 ratification, by the upper house of the Kyrgyz 
parliament, of the Kyrgyz-Chinese border delimitation agreement that had been 
signed in August of 1999 by Akaev and Chinese leader Jiang Zemin. The actual 
agreement resolved the issue of the Uzeng-Kuush river area which had been 
under negotiation between the Soviet Union and China from 1964-1991. 
(INTERFAX, 0951 GMT, 17 May 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0517, via World News 
Connection) While the mountainous region under dispute is non-arable and 
sparsely (if at all) inhabited, 70 percent remained with Kyrgyzstan and 30 percent 
was ceded to China.  
 
In combination with the Aksy riots of 17-18 March, the Uzeng-Kuush land issue 
added legitimacy to the protesters' blockade of the Osh-Bishkek highway and 
gave momentum to the opposition movement. The tensions, however, are largely 
fueled by clan-based disagreements over the equitable distribution of power. 
Akaev is from the Sarybagysh clan, a northern clan that predominately controls 
the key positions of government -- filling the ministries of internal affairs, state 
securities, and finance, as well as the president's chief of staff -- whereas 
southern clan groups such as the Ichkilik include Beknazarov and other 
prominent opposition figures. (EURASIANET, 5 Jun 02; via www.eurasianet.org) 
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Adding to the resentment caused by inequitable representation, some Uzbeks 
living in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan, who find themselves outside of Kyrgyz 
clan politics and without access to the control of power, are reported to be 
channeling their frustrations through "unsanctioned religious groups, especially 
the Hizb-ut-Tahrir" (IBID.) that seek to establish an Islamic caliphate in the 
southern regional center of Osh. ("KHABAR" INFORMATION 
AGENCY/KYRGYZSTAN PRESS-CLUB, 28 May 02; via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) On 28 May, two members of Hizb-ut-Tahrir were arrested in Osh 
(IBID.), and certainly the danger of religious/political extremism is felt throughout 
the Ferghana Valley region. 
 
Realizing the threat to his leadership, Akaev has attempted to reshuffle his 
government and to appease members of the strongest opposition groups. Bakiev 
was replaced by Nikolai Tanaev, an ethnic Russian and someone outside of clan 
affiliation, as interim prime minister. (EURASIANET, 31 May 02; via 
www.eurasianet.org) After the cabinet's resignation, moreover, Akaev expressed 
his desire to consult with opposition leaders in parliament. These offers were 
rejected by the communists and the results of meetings with other factions were 
not disclosed, though it is assumed that the most likely candidate to replace 
Tanaev is Naken Kasiev, governor of Osh region. (ITAR-TASS, 1410 GMT, 27 
May 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0527, via World News Connection)  
 
In addition to speaking of greater political inclusion, there have been other 
conciliatory actions which indicate an attempt to appease the protestors. On 24 
May, two days after the resignation of Akaev's cabinet, the one-year court 
sentence against Beknazarov was changed to time served (though provisions in 
Kyrgyz law forbid individuals with criminal records from holding positions in 
parliament). (EURASIANET, 31 May 02; via www.eurasianet.org, and 
INTERFAX, 0935 GMT, 3 Jun 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0605, via World News 
Connection) The following week, in a radio interview, Akaev confirmed that he 
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would "not stand in the next presidential election [in 2005] and is not grooming a 
successor." (KYRGYZ RADIO, 1505 GMT, 31 May 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database)  
 
Furthermore, Akaev is looking abroad for support and external legitimacy for his 
presidency, drawing upon relations with the West (the US and allied forces which 
have over 2,500 troops at Manas Airport in Bishkek) and Russia (with which he 
recently signed a Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation) to secure his control of 
the country. (ITAR-TASS, 1013 GMT, 30 May 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0530, via 
World News Connection) As of yet, however, he has not successfully negotiated 
internal tensions of power-sharing which fall heavily along the north-south 
division of clan groupings. It is unclear whether the reshuffling of the cabinet will 
be sufficient to appease the southern opposition, thus leaving Akaev either to 
search for ways to work with the southern clans in sharing power, or to follow the 
path of other Central Asian leaders by controlling opposition in a more heavy-
handed fashion. It is largely upon this question that the political stability of the 
country will depend. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Michael Varuolo 
 
Baltic NATO aspirations gain a boost 
The Baltic states received another boost to their efforts to obtain an invitation to 
join NATO, when on 28 May the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (PA) voted to 
support the inclusion of the seven aspirant countries during the November 
Prague Summit. (NATO PRESS RELEASE, 28 May 02; via www.nato-pa.int) 
Although NATO's Parliamentary Assembly operates independently of the 
alliance, its support is crucial to the enlargement process. In addition to their 
inclusion in the assembly statement, the Baltic states can draw reassurance from 
further emphasis by the chairman of the PA's Political Committee, Peter Viggers, 
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who asserted that "NATO remains open to all European democracies, regardless 
of geography" -- a statement that should further dispel any concerns of Baltic 
exclusion due to their status as former Soviet republics or due to Russian 
sentiment concerning the region. 
 
The assembly's support was reinforced further by the US Senate's passage on 
17 May of the Freedom Consolidation Act, which allows for the distribution of 
over $55 million to NATO aspirant countries. (ETA, 20 May 02; via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) Of this amount, the Baltic countries will receive $21 million to 
implement their Membership Action Plans and force modernizations. (BALTIC 
NEWS SERVICE, 18 May 02; via lexis-nexis) The additional funding represents a 
significant increase in defense spending opportunities for the Baltic states. 
 
Despite the news, there is a demonstrable reluctance in Lithuania to assume the 
NATO goal has been reached. The secretary of the foreign ministry, Giedrius 
Cekuolis, noted that although the legislative branch in the US has clearly 
demonstrated its support for the Baltics, Lithuania must continue to prepare for 
the Prague summit by completing its Membership Action Plan and by further 
coordination of defense-related issues with the other NATO aspirants. (BALTIC 
NEWS SERVICE, 20 May 02; via lexis-nexis)  
 
Estonia was even less reluctant than Lithuania to rejoice over recent events. The 
amount of funds designated for Estonia is in excess of 100 million Estonian 
Kroons (EEKS) and represents a substantial boost to the country's current 
defense budget, which is approximately 1.6 billion EEKS. (BALTIC NEWS 
SERVICE, 24 May 02; via lexis-nexis) However, this is not deemed to be 
sufficient to increase the pace of Estonia's modernization plans. On 24 May, the 
head of the Estonian parliament's national defense committee, Tiit Tammsaar, 
warned that the decision by the US Senate to allocate funds to Estonia for 
defense expenditures does not necessarily imply the arrival of modern weaponry 
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for the Estonian defense establishment. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE, 24 May 02; 
via lexis-nexis)  
 
This was reinforced by Estonian Defense Minister Sven Misker, who a week later 
outlined Estonia's modernization program. He stated that the cost of armaments 
was a significant planning factor and that "if [the funds] don't suffice for 
everything the priorities have to be soberly reviewed and only the essentials 
bought." (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE, 30 May 02; via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) 
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